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Abstract. For security and privacy management and enforcement pur-
poses, various policy languages have been presented. We give an overview
on 27 security and privacy policy languages and present a categorization
framework for policy languages. We show how the current policy lan-
guages are represented in the framework and summarize our interpreta-
tion. We show up identified gaps and motivate for the adoption of policy
languages for the specification of privacy-utility trade-off policies.
1 Introduction
The wide usage and growth of information systems comes together with threats
to security and privacy. Organizing large amounts of information and ensuring
security and privacy guidelines in (distributed) computer systems comes with
the requirement of technical means for explicitly defining and enforcing security
and privacy management strategies and agreements. Various policy languages
have been designed for these purposes.
A policy in the context of this work is a set of rules that describe what to de-
cide and hence, how to maintain a certain situation. A policy language is a set
of syntax and semantics that is used to express policies. A security policy lan-
guage is used to formulate rules that, being enforced, ensure the confidentiality,
availability and integrity of a particular system. Some security policy languages
include means of formulating accountability rules. Accountability is especially
considered when data is stored on third-party systems, e.g. in cloud computing,
or shared with third parties, e.g. for advertisements. A privacy policy language
is used to formulate rules that are enforced to preserve the privacy of certain
objects by ensuring the confindetiality of person-identifiable information (PII)
as well as context information and meta data that, being available, may lead to
the disclose of PII. Depending on the scope of a policy language, it may consider
the privacy of the users of a system or owners of data stored in a system.
In this work, we have analyzed the most known security and privacy policy lan-
guages. In our search, we also considered languages that are not explicitly stated
as security or privacy languages by the authors, but, at least partially, allow for
the definition of corresponding rules. All the investigated policy languages are
machine-readable.
Various application fields can be addressed by the policy languages presented
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in the literature. This includes e.g. access control in different areas, security in
centralized and distributed computing including third-party computing, agree-
ments on data usage in enterprises and between users and services. However, we
could not identify a language that considers privacy-preserving data analysis as
a use case. To the best of our knowledge, there exist no language that addresses
the description of privacy-utility trade-off agreements. The increase of the anal-
ysis of a large datasets that may contain data from multiple parties, and the
previously unknown magnitude of mass surveillance1 require the avoidance of
sharing plaintext information. Instead, privacy-utility trade-offs may lead to a
reduced amount of information available to third parties.
In this work, we investigate the current state of the art in policy languages with
security and privacy scopes. In addition of categorizing the presented languages
in this scope, we identify and discuss open issues that may be addressed by
policies. Our contribution is as follows:
1. We give an overview of policy languages presented in the literature.
2. We present a framework for a multidimensional categorization of the pre-
sented policy languages.
3. We identify and discuss open research issues w.r.t. information sharing that
cannot be completely addressed by one of the presented languages.
4. We motivate for the invention of policy languages that handle privacy-utility
trade-off by providing means of negotiation and agreement specification.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The categorization framework is
presented in section 2. In section 3, the identified policy languages are fitted into
the categorization framework and analyzed based on the categories. Related
work is presented in section 4. Section 5 is reserved for discussion and future
work. We conclude our work in section 6.
2 Categorization Framework
Several policy languages that address security related issues have been presented
in literature. Our goal of designing a categorization framework was to provide
a systematic overview of proposed policy languages and pointing out existing
gaps. The framework consists of four main categories: The Type, the Intention
of Use, the Scope, and the Design and Implementation Details. In the following,
we describe each of the categories and its subcategories.
2.1 Type
The design, expressiveness and syntax of a policy language depend on the goal
its user is intended to achieve. In the current security and privacy related poli-
cies, we identified nine types based on the intended goal, which we define as
subcategories.
1 https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/52
Fig. 1. Multidimensional categorization of state-of-the-art security and privacy related
policy languages.
1. Security: In this subcategory, we categorize all policy languages that allow
for the definition of general security-related issues rather than considering a
proper subset of the security aspect.
2. Accountability: A language enables for accountability if it contains sup-
porting means, i.e. rules on logging, notification, retention and location of
data [8]. In this subcategory, all languages that enable -at least partially- for
formulating accountability rules are classified.
3. Availability: A language has the scope availability if it enables for stating
rules w.r.t the security mean of availability. This type includes languages
that, in addition to availability, do not explicitly provide security enhancing
definitions for other security goals.
4. Privacy: Languages that focus on privacy-enhancing rules as the confiden-
tiality of person-identifiable information as well as context information and
the handling of privacy-relevant data.
5. Data carriage: Languages that provide a structured format for data car-
riage as well as data handling relevant information are classified into this
subcategory.
6. Data usage control: Languages that enable for the definition of rules for
controlling the data usage are classified here.
7. Network and device management: These languages are mainly designed
for the definition of rules that control the management of devices and net-
works of an organization.
In order to classify a language w.r.t. its overall goal, the category Type must be
considered together with the categories Intention of Use and Scope.
2.2 Intention of Use
Policy language for different intentions of use have been designed and presented.
Based on this intention, they may mainly address the requirements of a user, an
enterprise or multiple interacting parts w.r.t. the defined scope. The identified
intentions are formulated as subcategories as follows:
1. Users requirements: Some languages are intended to be used for specifying
the security or privacy requirements of a user of a system or the owner of
data on a system. Rules can be formulated for (privacy-preserving) access
control, browsing privacy, user’s privacy requirements while sharing PII, or
data owners’ privacy while sharing collected information with others.
2. Enterprises policies: In this category we collect languages that are used
for the description of how an enterprise implements privacy-related policies.
3. Multiple Parties interaction: The languages of this category are used
for stating privacy requirement of a service requestor on one side, and the
abilities of meeting these requirements on the server side.
For the classification of a language w.r.t. to its overall goal, the Intention of Use
must of a language must be considered together with the Type and Scope.
2.3 Scope
This category represents the number and type of actors of the use cases a policy
language is intended to be designed for. This intention highly influences the
design of a language. The scope mus always be considered together with the type
of the language and the intention of use. We define the following subcategories:
1. Data exchange: These languages are intended to be used for the descrip-
tion of how and under which conditions data is exchanged between different
parties.
2. Service requester/service provider: Languages that are considered as
service requester/serice provider languages are intended to be used for stat-
ing the conditions a service may be requested. Languages that are considered
as belonging to this category can be considered as a tuple L = (lr, lp) with lr
the syntax the requester uses for stating his requirements, and lp the syntax
the provider uses for stating his capabilities w.r.t. a certain use case and
depending on the intention of the use of the policy language.
3. Agreement descriptions: Languages that are considered as Information
sharing agreement languages are intended to be used to specify under which
conditions data is transferred from one party to another in a system.
4. Authorization: Languages that are explicitly meant to be used for provid-
ing authorization information and rules.
5. Access control: Languages that are categorized as access control languages
are intended to be used for stating the conditions under which certain defined
subjects may access certain defined objects in a system.
6. Application Monitoring: These languages provide means of specifying ap-
plication monitoring rules. This may include design and development, test-
ing, and runtime monitoring.
2.4 Design and Implementation Details
In this category, we consider design choices that influence the implementation of
a language considering its usability, its context sensitivity, the used syntax and
whether a language’s syntax is intended to be extensible.
Usability We refer to the human readability and ease of handling of a policy
language with usability. All languages we have identified are machine-readable.
On the other hand, some of them are explicitly meant to be usable. We define
the subcategories human-oriented and machine-oriented.
1. Human-oriented languages: Languages that explicitly consider the us-
ability of its syntax and framework (if any) and are intended to be written
and read by human beings are categorized as human-oriented.
2. Machine-oriented languages: Languages that are intended to be read by
a machine and do not consider the usability in their design are categorized
as machine-oriented.
Context sensitivity
1. Context sensitive: The policy languages considered as belonging to this
class allow to address values/variables of the environment in their rules and
conditions. This means that the environment is explicitly considered in the
policy definition and decision process. It may cover environment (system)
variables, time and environment-specific data, e.g. the current location.
2. Non-sensitive: If a policy language does not allow for addressing informa-
tion extracted from the environment, it is considered non-sensitive.
Syntax Depending on the use case, the decision of using a certain policy lan-
guage may be influenced by the syntax the language use. We identify the subcat-
egories XML-based, High-level language-based, Functional language-based and
specific syntax-based.
1. XML based syntax: The XML standard [15] enables for a common lan-
guage which is especially interesting in distributed environments. The ease
of processing XML structured data is one reason that many policy languages
are defined as XML derivatives.
2. High-level language based syntax: Based on the context of use of a
policy language, it may be useful to have a syntax that is close to the contexts
syntax and as expressive as high level languages are. This holds especially
for policies that are used for runtime monitoring and software development
lifecycle control.
3. Functional language/logic based syntax: Languages that are defined
on the basis of a functional programming language can enhance the process
of automatically proof security properties of configurations.
4. Specific syntax: Some languages introduce a specific syntax. The properties
of the syntax may intersect with the properties of the syntax’ of the other
subcategories.
Extensibility Some Languages are defined for a specific application. Others
are defined for fulfilling certain purposes that can be performed by different
applications. This needs a flexibility in the syntax by providing extension points.
This category determines whether and to which extend a language is extensible.
1. Application specific languages: A language that belongs to this subcate-
gory has been designed for a certain application scenario and cannot be used
outside that specific purpose. The extensibility of these languages is limited,
if given at all.
2. General purpose languages: This type of languages is designed with no
consideration of a certain application or purpose. It has the properties that
its syntax is general and extensible.
3 Fitting the Framework with Policy Languages
3.1 Overview of the policy languages
In this section, we give a brief overview of the considered policy languages. Then
we fit the languages into the categorization framework presented in section 2.
XACML XACML is an access control policy language and comes together
with a request/response language for two-way communication [13]. It consists of
a set of standard XML elements and defines standard extension points for in-
dividual rules, data types and procedures. As XACML is an established OASIS
standard, there exist several implementations and extensions. Among the exten-
sions are profiles for usage control [19], privacy policy [20] in terms of specifying
the purpose of actions. Other policy languages, e.g. PPL 3.1, A-PPL 3.1 and
GeoXACML have been implemented as extensions of XACML.
PPL The PrimeLife Policy Language [5] has been developed in the PrimeLife
project2 as an extension to XACML. It allows for privacy-preserving access con-
trol using application independent certified credentials for authorization, i.e. in
2 http://www.primelife.eu
PPL a data controller can grant a data subject access to a reseource without the
data subject needed to reveal his identity, by proving certain properties. Data
handling policies tell what will happen to credential information that a data sub-
ject has revealed in order to get access to a certain resource. A user can state his
data handling preferences. It defines means for specifying the authorization pur-
pose as well as downstream usage, i.e. the minimal access control policy that has
to be enforced when sharing information with other parties. Provisional actions
that an access requester must perform before getting access to a resource enable
to put restrictions on the number of times a credential is being granted access.
A sticky policy of a certain resource tells which authorizations and obligations
the data controller has to adhere to.
A-PPL The Accountability Policy Language has been developed as an exten-
sion for the PrimeLife Policy Language (PPL). It is designed for the definition of
machine-readable accountability policies. In addition to PPL, it enables for the
definition of rules for improving the transparency of processing personal data.
This is done by introducing accountability rules, i.e. rules on data retention,
data location, logging and notification. Data retention rules allow to set a va-
lidity duration of a data usage purpose. The data location is controlled by a
region identifier that specify in which region a resource can be used for a certain
purpose. For auditing and logging purposes, A-PPL enables for the creation of
evidences for certain privacy-relevant triggers and the collection of the created
evidences, and the definition of, optionally encrypted, action log elements, re-
spectively. Notification is done by defining types of notifications that have to be
sent to defined recipients on a certain action.
GeoXACML The Geospatial eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(GeoXACML) extends XACML for declaring and enforcing access control poli-
cies that contain geometric and topological descriptions of the resources. It has
been developed by the Open Geospatial Consortium3.
XACL The XML Access control language (XACL) has been developed by the
IBM Tokyo Research Laboratory [1] in 2000. It builds upon XML and aimed at
providing security policies that could be enforced on certain accesses to XML
documents. It was intended to be used for the specification of object-subject-
action-condition policies. A subject may have an identity, a group or a rule.
Objects can address single elements in an XML document. Actions include read,
write, create and delete and are extensible. The right to perform an action can
be bound to provisions like auditing, verification of a digital signature, encryp-
tion, XSL transformations, or simple additional actions [23]. To the best of our
knowledge, neither it has been further developed nor extensively used.
3 http://www.opengeospatial.org/
SecPAL SecPAL is a decentralized, declarative authorization language of Mi-
crosoft Research in Cambridge4. Logical clauses are used to express policies and
credentials. On an access request, the request is mapped onto logical authoriza-
tion queries. The access decision is made based on the result of checking the
authorization query against a database of clauses. It is shown that the decision
procedure is effective, decidable and tractable. Subjects are granted rights in
terms of predicates. These predicates can be delegated and revoked later on.
SecPAL comes with a human-readable syntax and semantic simplicity, while be-
ing expressive and flexible enough for authorization in different applications [10].
SecPAL4P SecPAL4P is a language that extends SecPAL 3.1 for specify-
ing the handling of personally identifiable information (PII). A user defines his
preferences on how data collecting services should treat her PII, expressed as
a SecPAL assertions. Data collecting services define policies as SecPAL queries
that tell how they would treat PII, once collected. For the decision of an au-
thorization request, the data handling policies are matched against the users’
preferences. The decision is made based on the matching outcome [11].
AIR AIR5 is designed for the definition of rules that enhance accountable pri-
vacy protection in the Semantic Web [28]. Supporting scoped contextualized rea-
soning (SCR), nested graphs, built-in functions as inherited from N3Logic [12],
it extends N3Logic’s features with the support of rule reuse and rule nesting. It
provides automated explanation of rule-based inference by dependancy tracking.
AIR thus provides detailed explanations for its reasoning. The explanations can
be customized such that they hide sensitive information.
APPEL The Adaptable and Programmable Policy Environment and Language
(APPEL) [39] has been developed in the ACCENT project at the Unviersity of
Stirling in 2013. It initially focused on providing means of policies for automatic
telephone call control. Due to its extensibility and domain-independency, other
use case scenarios, e.g. the management of sensor networks could be easily and
meaningfully implemented. APPEL provides a simple but expressive syntax that
is intended to be usable by lay users while providing means for experts to describe
of complex details of a system. A policy rule contains triggers, conditions and
actions. The specific names used in the rule contents are defined according to
the domain of each use case.
P3P The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P [40]) has been developed as
a W3C standard for the expression of web user’s privacy preferences and data
collection policies of a service provider. A preference/policy tells for certain data
items for which purpose they will be collected, who will receive the data and until
4 http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/labs/cambridge/
5 http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/AIR/
when will the collected data be kept. Users can use agents, e.g. browser plug-
ins, to automatically extract the information of the data collection policies of a
service provider and match it against her preference. Based on the outcome of a
preferences/policy match, they may proceed in using a service, and hence, share
the information mentioned in the policy. Or the user decides not to use a service.
It aimed at helping the users to understand and being aware of the process of
collecting privacy-relevant data. Due to the lack of negotiability between users
and services, and its limited scope, P3P is no more in use.
APPEL (P3P) APPEL [16] is an extension of P3P that allows a user to
express her privacy preferences in a preference ruleset. It basically contain which
P3P policy is unacceptable for the user. The ruleset of a policy can be used by
the user agent to automatically or semi-automatically decide whether it accepts
a P3P privacy policy of a website or not. As P3P is obsolete, APPEL is not used
anymore.
XPref In APPEL 3.1, it is not possible to specify which privacy policies would
be acceptable for a user. Agrawal et al have designed XPref [3] to provide an
alternative to APPEL that overcomes its shortcomings and provides a subset of
XPath as a simplified syntax. They show that XPref is able to replace APPEL
and that, compared to APPEL, the formulation of preferences are less error
prone in XPref.
P2U The Purpose-to-use policy language (P2U) [26] is a policy language that
has been designed as an improvement of P3P. In contrast to P3P, It allows for
specifying privacy policies that take into account the selling and sharing of infor-
mation between different applications and data consumers. A policy is defined
to specify which data a user is going to share with a third-party application.
For privacy preservation, P2U allows to include information about the purpose
of data sharing, data retention time, whether and for which price the data can
be selled. It also enables for negotiation on prices and data retention between
different data consumers.
E-P3P The Platform for Enterprise Privacy Practices (E-P3P) [7] can be used
by enterprises to formalize theorganization-wide handling of collected data. For
this purpose, a fine-grained privacy policy model is defined. It allows for defining
whether a certain enterprise affiliate may use certain collected data for a specified
pupose. E-P3P is formally defined and the authors show that translating into
XSLT is possible. They provide a Java-based authorization engine for E-P3P
policies.
EPAL The Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) [6] has been
designed by IBM for defining enterprise privacy policies on collected data in an
enterprise. It provides means of administrating data handling practices in an
enterprises’ IT systems. It allows for the formulation of positive and negative
authorization rights. It abstracts from deployment details for providing simple,
privacy-authorization-centric constructs. EPAL policies define hierarchical data
categories of the collected data, data user categories, data usage purposes, sets of
(privacy) actions on the collected data, obligations, and conditions. Obligations
allow for the definition of data retention.
CPExchange The Customer Profile Exchange language (CPExchange) [14]
provides an XML-based data model for the use of customer data within enter-
prise applications. It facilitates the exchange of data by providing standard data
formats and provides metadata for sticking privacy control to the data. Cor-
responding P3P-based privacy policies, called declarations, are defined in the
header of a CPExchange document. To the best of our knowledge, the version
1.0 CPExchange specification has not been updated since 2000. Thus we assume
it to be obsolete.
Jeeves Jeeves has been designed at MIT in 2012 [42] for the enforcement of
information flow policies. It provides means for specifying who can see what in-
formation flows through a program. Thus, it can be used for specifying privacy
policies. Jeeves is program-independent, as it allows for policy-agnostic progrm-
ming by separately implementing policies on sensitive values from the program’s
core functionality. It has been implemented in Scala, while being formally defined
and proven to be confidentiality keeping.
PSLang The Policy Specification Language PSLang has been designed by Er-
lingsson and Schneider [21] for runtime monitoring. The idea is to inline security
automatons in the code for monitoring. A PSLang policy consist of variable dec-
larations that represent the security state, security relevant events, and a Java
code fragment for each event that tells how the security state variables should
be updated on the occurence of an event. PSLang does not come with a for-
mal semantics, i.e. it is as powerful at the Java constructs are. Hence, matching
policies is undecidable.
ConSpec ConSpec [4] is an automata-based policy specification language. It
can be used for the definition of machine-readable contracts. It defines means for
the definition of security policies and its enforcement. The security specification
of a ConSpec policy can be enforced at all the three lifecycle stages of an appli-
cation, i.e. the development, the installation and the runtime stage. Designed as
an improvement of PSLang, a ConSpec policy describes simplified security state
variables: its domains are finite, and a guarded command language is used for
the updates. The used guards are side-effect free and commands do not contain
loops. This simplifies the language and hence allows for a more simple seman-
tics. Policies that define contracts can be automatically matched. For a better
suitability for application, ConSpec allows for expressing security requirements
on different levels.
Polymer Polymer (Princeton 2004) [9] is a set of Java classes that are used as in-
lined security automata for monitoring. A policy object consists of an application
action, a security state and a decision procedure for handling security-sensitive
actions. In case of violation, they trigger defined actions, e.g. recovery actions.
SLAng SLAng [18] has been developed for the formalization and specification
of service level agreements (SLAs) and service-based contract negotiation and
monitoring. Service level agreements are specified as Quality of Service (QoS)
attributes, i.e. availability, throughput and delay. An SLAng policy is called
SLA and consists of a service description, contract statements, and service-level
specifications. SLAng provides the negotiation of QoS properties. SLAng allows
to quantitatively describe a service, compose new service offerings out of more
than one SLA, and validate an SLA’s syntax and consistency. IT comes together
with monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. From a security point of view,
SLAng organizationally ensures the availability of services. Being designed for
the use in Cloud-based services, it has been extended with means of for the
description of security and privacy policies [31].
SAML The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [34] is an OASIS
standard that addresses the single sign-on problem. It provides means for the
exchange of authentication and authorization data between domains in the XML
format. Subject properties like the identity, attributes and entitlements can be
asserted to other entities in enterprise applications. SAML comes with strong
security and privacy considerations [30].
WS-Security WS-Security [2] [36] is a header format for SOAP messages that
enables for the definition of security headers. Hence, it is specified for a certain
message format and the purpose of exchanging data for enabling security mech-
anisms. A security header may contain security tokens, signatures, encryption
elements, or timestamps. WS-Security covers multiple security models and al-
lows for several encryption technologies. A security header may contain elements
that are used either for intermediate recipients of a message, or for end recipi-
ents. Build upon WS-Security, WS-Trust is a framework that defines the format
of security token managing messages as well as negotiation/challenge extensions.
PRML The Privacy Rights Markup Language (PRML) [43] is a privacy-aware
access control language. A PRML policy, called PRML declaration, contains of
the linking of objects. Objects in PRML can be roles, operations, data groups,
subjects, purposes, constraints, actions and transformations. A PRML declara-
tion specifies for a certain role to be allowed to perform a certain operation on
a certain subject’s data group for a purpose. The declaration optionally include
constraints and specifications of actions that must be performed immediately
after or before a defined event. PRML has been developed by Zero Knowledge
in 2001.
Ponder The Imperial College’s policy language Ponder [17] is a powerful multiple-
purpose policy language for the definition of security and management policies.
Intended to be used in distributed systems, it provides access control and obli-
gation policies that can be enhanced with means that are important for that
environment. Ponder provides means for authorization policies as well as poli-
cies for filtering input and output parameters of actions. This limits the visibility
of information when intended. Refrain policies allow the subject-side definition of
conditions when, although initially permitted, actions should not be performed
by a subject. Obligation policies specify which actions managers have to perform
on the accurance of certain events. Delegation policies allow a user for temporar-
ily delegating access rights. In addition to roles, subjects can be classed into
groups. These groups can be addressed in policies. Ponder is object-oriented and
allows inheritance. Thus, role hierarchies, complex management structures and
new policy classes can be formulated. Policy classes can be used to instantiate
multiple policies. Composite policies allow for the definition of rules for groups,
roles, relationships and management structures. These feature enable large-scale
enterprises to use Ponder effenctively.
Rei Rei is an OWL lite-based6 security and management policy language de-
veloped by HP in 2002 [27]. It allows for defining policies in first order logic and
RDF. It is application and domain independent and object-oriented. It allows
for the definition of actions, constraints, obligations, delegation and policy types.
A policy type can be instantiated, and a policy and an action can be bound to
a certain subject. Meta-policies contain priority and precedence information for
policy interpretation and policy conflict resolving. Being similar to Ponder in
some extent, Rei allows for considering group based, role based and individual
based policies. However, Rei differs from Ponder by using unified constructs for
the different subject types for simplification.
USDL The Unified Service Description Language (USDL) [33] has been de-
signed for the description of services in the Internet of Service. It covers the
description of services from different perspectives, including business, opera-
tional and technical views. USDL is an attempt to include information about
legal requirements, pricing and quality of service in a structured, automatically
processable way. Ensuring the availability of the functionalities of the Internet
of Service, USDL can be considered as security relevant policy language.
Fig. 2. *
Table 1. Fitting the policy languages into the categorization framework.
3.2 Fitting into the Framework and Interpretation
In this work, we identified 27 policy languages that can be considered as at least
partially suitable for the definition of security and privacy rules. We fitted the
identified languages into our framework, as visualized in Table 1.
From the fitting, we conclude that eleven out of 27 policy languages could be
identified clearly as security policy languages, forming the security policy lan-
guages cluster. Four security policy languages have a clear scope in application
monitoring. Six security policy languages are access control policy languages. In
addition to specifying access control policies, some of these languages provide
means of formulating service request and response roles that carry additional
information. Only one of the ten security policy languages, SecPAL, explicitly
considers data exchange in addition to the formulation of authorization rules.
All identified subclusters contain languages that either provide means of formu-
lating user specified rules or preferences, enterprise policies or means for multiple
party intersction.
An eleventh language, Jeeves, could be interpreted as security policy language
as well as a privacy policy language for application monitoring.
Twelve out of 27 policy languages could be clearly identified as privacy policy
languages. In this privacy policy language cluster, each subcluster contains lan-
guages that are intended to be used either by users or enterprises, respectively.
Half of the twelve privacy policy languages have the scope in data exchange. In
addition to data exchange, some of these languages provide means of specifying
authentication, agreement and access control rules. Two out of twelve privacy
policy languages are designed for privacy-preserving access control. Two other
languages are intended to be used as authorization languages.
6 See section 2.1 of http://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-owl-features-20040210
The remaining three policy languages are of the type network and device man-
agement (APPEL), network and device management and availability and data
carriage (SLAng), and availability (USDL). Originally not intended to be used
for security policy formulation, they provide means of formulation policies that
consider availability, i.e. Quality of Service (SLAng, USDL), or are extensible to
security-specifying syntax (APPEL, USDL).
4 Related Work
There have been efforts done in categorizing current policy languages w.r.t. cer-
tain scopes. Han et al. from the Fudan university in Shanghai categorized policy
languages used in network and security management [24]. They investigated
eleven policy languages and identified six categories, where each category repre-
sent a binary statement, i.e. a feature that is either represented in the considered
policy language or not. By categorizing, they identified whether a policy language
follows the event-condition action paradigm, whether its syntax is XML-based,
whether the policy language provides policy indexing for an efficient retrieval,
whether the language suppport role-based access control [22], whether it provides
means of defining obligations, and whether a policy language has been formally
defined and policies are thus automatically reasonable. While being meaninful
in revealing basic information about each policy language, this categorization
does not provide means of gap identification in the research security and policy
languages.
In 2007, Kumaraguru et al from Carnegie Mellon university investigated 13 pri-
vacy policy languages and categorized them into four categories: sophisticated
access control languages, web privacy policy languages, enterprise privacy policy
languages, and context sensitive languages. For each category, they classified the
languages into user for user preferences, or enterprise for enterprise policies [29].
This category includes an overall view on the analyzed policy languages. It en-
abled for gap identification and doing further research towards new policy lan-
guages. However, it did not include a more fine-grained view on the languages.
Despite from distinguishing user preferences and enterprise policies, no further
considerations were made. Policy languages that are intended for the definition
of multiple party interaction policies cannot be fitted into one of these categories.
In addition, languages that can be used for multiple purposes by providing ex-
tensibility cannot be represented in that categorization. We assume that the
reason for the presence of these lacks in expressiveness is that since 2007, new
application scenarios have become more important, e.g. cloud computing, online
social networking and data exchange scenarios.
Our work builds upon Kumaraguru et al [29] by supplementing more fine-grained
and multidimensional categories. With this framework, we aim at being enabled
to identify new applications areas in which policy languages can improve the
clear understanding, definition and enforcement of security and privacy enhanc-
ing technologies.
5 Open Issues and Future Work
The policy languages under consideration cover the security policy formulation
from different points of view. They provide the means for clearly stating what
should be done in which sense with the data under consideration. Some of the
languages come with mechanisms of negotiating policies and solving conflicts or
providing enforcement mechanisms [18] [26]. However, neither one of the pre-
sented languages provides means of negotiating certain data properties, nor pre-
senting agreements on which amount of information represented by data is being
provided. To motivate for the requirement of languages that provide these means,
we describe the following scenario:
Enterprises (data holders) want to share data with a centralized analysis en-
tity, the data analyzer in order to profit by gaining new knowledge and gen-
eralizable information from the results of data analysis on a big data corpus.
While data holders are interested in saving the confidentiality and privacy of
the person-identifiable information for privacy concerns, data analysts seek for
the availability of that information for maximum utility of the data. In order
to solve the resulting conflict, the parties of the information sharing scenario
agree on a trade-off between data privacy and utility. As a result, a relaxation of
the privacy preservation w.r.t. utility of data may be defined. Depending on the
quality of the trade-off, the privacy of the data owners is still preserved, while
certain information is kept available for the data analyzer. The parties may
state their agreement in a policy. This policy can be used later on to enforce the
technical implications of the agreement, by applying suitable privacy-enhancing
technologies. Applying the privacy-preserving technologies results in produced
data appearances. The data appearances include all the information necessary
for the data analyzer, while keeping additional information confidential for pri-
vacy.
With the improving efficiency of encrypted computing [38][32], it is assumed
that homomorphic encryption will serve as a key concept in utility-respecting
privacy-enhancing technologies.
With the categorization framework presented in this work, we can easily see
that neither such a privacy-utility trade-off is considered, nor a policy lan-
guage that would sufficiently describe such agreements has been presented. He
et al. present a formal definition of Blowfish privacy for privacy-utility trade-off
in databases [25]. First attempts towards practical implemnetation of privacy-
utility trade-offs have been presented in the field of logfile and packet trace
anonymization [35][37][41]. The authors provide anonymization mechanisms that
allow for the retrieval of certain information. However, neither a systematic anal-
ysis of privacy risk is presented, nor the possibility on agreeing on a application-
specific policy on the performed privacy-relaxation is possible.
Adapting the privacy-utility-trade-off concept to non-database or logfile appli-
cations and enhancing the transition into real-life applications is intended to be
future work.
In the scenario described above, hiding the identity of the information sharing
parties may be of interest. After an anonymous negotiation process about the
properties an entity has to fulfill in order to be authorized for information shar-
ing, an enterprise may communicate with the data analyzer with a credential-
based identity that does not reveal its identity. Credential-based authorization
is presented in the PrimeLife project PPL [5]. However, no negotiation process
is presented. Including negotiation would enhance the user’s choice. Enriching
such a negotiation with decision advice that considers application-specifc threats
to privacy would lead towards user-friendly privacy-preserving technologies.
6 Conclusions
In this work, we investigated the most known security and privacy related pol-
icy languages. We presented a fine-grained categorization framework for the lan-
guages. Based on the analysis of the languages, we identified the lack of a lan-
guage providing the specification of policies that represent privacy-utility trade-
off negotiations and agreements. We motivated for the privacy-utility trade-offs
with a use case scenario. With the expected improving efficiency of mechanisms
for encrypted computations7, we identified future work that would encapsulate
these mechanisms behind policy-based frameworks.
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